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Giving Hardison the Hook: Restoring Title VII’s Undue
Hardship Standard
I NTRODUCTION : A H ALLOWED Y ET H OLLOW P ROMISE
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to place an affirmative duty on
employers to reasonably accommodate all aspects of employees’ sincerely
held religious beliefs or practices.1 Employers cannot surmount this
congressional command unless they can show that doing so would impose
an undue hardship on the conduct of their business operations.2 Although
a critical part of Congress’s civil rights campaign, this “hallowed”
protection designed to guide all religious accommodation cases has far too
often proven a hollow promise for many Americans. Even though Title
VII prescribes robust religious accommodations for America’s workforce,
in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,3 the Supreme Court severely
stunted the amendment’s scope—binding all lower courts to its extremely
narrow and unnatural construction of Title VII’s undue hardship standard.4
Through one, almost passing, sentence, the Court confusingly
interpreted “undue hardship” to mean anything more than a de minimis
cost to the employer.5 This created a toothless standard that flouts the
text’s ordinary meaning and the statute’s purpose and corresponding
legislative intent. More detrimental than mere defective statutory
interpretation, however, Hardison’s holding hobbled Title VII’s religious
accommodation requirement, leaving many religious employees to face a
harmful Hobson’s choice. And because secularity and mainstream
Christianity are the default of the American workplace and workweek,6
people of minority faiths have been the most adversely affected by the
Court’s tenuous interpretation of undue hardship.7

1. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)).
2. Id.
3. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
4. See Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227, 1229 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari).
5. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 (“To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order
to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”).
6. See, e.g., Gwendolyn Yvonne Alexis, Not Christian, but Nonetheless Qualified: The
Secular Workplace – Whose Hardship?, 3 J. RELIGION & BUS. ETHICS 1, 23–24 (2012).
7. See id.
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By reasoning that employers need not spend a penny more or exert
any energy beyond the de minimis, the Court unevenly passed crushing
economic, social, and moral costs on to employees, especially religious
minorities. And under Hardison’s harsh holding, many employees often
must either choose to contravene their religious convictions to comply
with their employers’ seemingly neutral policies or render their obedience
to the Divine, often at the expense of their job. For most devout believers,
although financially difficult, the answer is easy: they will choose to “obey
God rather than men.”8 Congress enacted the 1972 amendment to
effectually forestall such steep choices,9 but Hardison forbears the statute
from fully functioning.
The stark dichotomy between the statute and Hardison has received
much attention in academia.10 Literature on the de minimis standard is
legion. And while the arguments for or against correcting Hardison vary,
most articles arise around times when it looks like the Court or Congress
will rearrange the icy post-Hardison landscape in which religious
accommodation claims find themselves. This paper follows hard on the
heels of two significant developments that offer a glimmer of hope for
future religious accommodation claimants. First, in 2020, three justices
concurred in denying certiorari that although the particular petition was
not the right vehicle, they would inevitably like to reconsider Hardison.11
Second, in early April 2021, the Court denied two similar petitions asking
it to revisit Hardison, but this time two justices directly lambasted
Hardison in dissent.12 Justice Thomas curiously did not join the recent
dissent even though he joined the 2020 concurrence.13 But based on his
previous signaling that Hardison should be revisited, he likely did not
consider the most recent petitions suitable vehicles for the endeavor rather
than expressing his disinterest in the topic.

8. Acts 5:29; see, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. 63.
9. See infra Section I.C.
10. See, e.g., Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1997); Debbie N. Kaminer, Title
VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees: Proposals for
an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPLOY. LAB. L. 575 (2000).
11. See Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 140 S. Ct. 685 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (along with Justices Thomas and Gorsuch).
12. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting in
denial of certiorari) (along with Justice Alito); Dalberiste v. GLE Assocs., Inc., 814 F. App’x 495
(11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 19-1461, 2021 WL 1240921 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2021).
13. Compare Patterson, 140 S. Ct. at 685 (Justice Thomas joining), with Small, 141 S. Ct. at
1227 (Justice Thomas not joining).
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In light of these recent developments, it seems increasingly inevitable
that the Court will someday take up a case that will finally give Hardison
the hook. And although there are a couple of avenues to eliminate or at
least mitigate Hardison’s hobbling effects, as Justice Gorsuch explained,
the royal road to abrogating Hardison lies in the Court correcting its own
mistake.14 The difficulty navigating that road is finding an adequate
vehicle. Yet when the Court finds a golden vehicle, it should grant cert and
ultimately abrogate Hardison, ideally by interpreting undue hardship to
mean significant difficulty or expense.
Part I of this paper begins by briefly reviewing the winding road to
Hardison to tee up how its de minimis standard was decided on faulty
grounds. Part II argues how the Hardison Court completely contravened
the text, purpose, and legislative intent of the 1972 amendment, thus
stunting the statute’s full realization. Part III then highlights Hardison’s
hobbling effects on religious accommodation claims, particularly claims
brought by religious minorities. After reasoning that there are only two
possible solutions that could truly give Hardison the hook, Part IV
concludes by asserting that, although anything is better than Hardison’s
unnatural de minimis standard, the ideal solution is the Court interpreting
undue hardship to mean significant difficulty or expense. But to get there,
the right vehicle has to reach the Court. Giving Hardison the hook will
restore the undue hardship standard and promote pluralism in the
workplace, fundamental to human dignity and equity.

I. T HE W INDING R OAD TO H ARDISON
A. The EEOC’s Creation and Its 1966 and 1967 Guidelines
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was one of Congress’s
most seminal exercises of power.15 At the core of Title VII of that Act,
Congress sought to eradicate employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion—each a classification for
which countless Americans have faced discrimination.16 To ensure that
Title VII would accomplish its mission, Congress created the Equal
14. Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1229 (2021) (“There is no barrier to our review and no one else to
blame. The only mistake here is of the Court’s own making—and it is past time for the Court to correct
it.”).
15. See generally Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 424 (2015) (assessing the importance of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and granted it regulatory
power to implement the statute.17 The EEOC’s regulatory power would
prove to be an integral part in developing the religious accommodation
requirement.
As originally enacted, the statutory language proscribed employment
discrimination on the basis of religion,18 but Title VII lacked an explicit
requirement for employers to affirmatively provide religious
accommodations.19 The ambiguity brought up “whether the Act merely
prohibited discrimination on the basis of religion20 or whether it also
required employers to affirmatively accommodate an employee’s religious
needs.”21 After receiving many employee complaints about being unable
to observe their Sabbath or religious holidays, the EEOC first introduced
a reasonable accommodation requirement in its 1966 Guidelines.22 The
EEOC expressed that under Title VII, “the duty not to discriminate on
religious grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to
accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of employees and, in some
cases, prospective employees where such accommodation can be made
without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.”23 Although
the EEOC affirmed that Title VII obligated employers to provide
reasonable accommodations, it reasoned that employers could “establish a
normal workweek (including paid holidays) generally appliable to all
employees.”24
But only one year later, after receiving even more employee
complaints about Sabbath-day observance, the Commission amended its
Guidelines “to require accommodation except in cases where ‘undue
hardship,’ as opposed to ‘serious inconvenience,’ would result.”25 The
Commission also signaled that employers “could no longer rely on the
establishment of a neutral work week as a defense against a claim of
religious discrimination under Title VII.”26 The amended Guidelines thus
17. Id. at § 2000e-4.
18. Originally both disparate treatment and impact theories. See EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, SECTION 12: RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (2021).
19. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 580.
20. Like Title VII’s other protected classes.
21. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 580.
22. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967) (codifying
the 1966 Guidelines).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 581; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968) (codifying the 1967
Guidelines) (“Undue hardship” appearing for the first time in accommodation contexts).
26. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 581.
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substantially heightened the threshold to successfully defend against a
religious accommodation claim.
B. Typical Judicial Treatment of the Guidelines Pre-1972 Amendment
Even though the amended Guidelines substantially heightened the
threshold to successfully defend against a religious accommodation claim,
many courts ended up ignoring the amended, codified Guidelines by
narrowly construing the statute by continuing to focus on neutrality.27 Two
cases, in particular, illustrate the narrow judicial reasoning that Congress
ultimately rejected in Title VII’s 1972 amendment.28
In 1971, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed a Sixth Circuit
ruling involving a Sabbath-observance accommodation.29 After a decade
at Reynolds Metals, Robert Dewey joined the Faith Reformed Church in
1961.30 About a year prior, Reynolds Metal entered into a collective
bargaining agreement that empowered the company “to set straight time
and overtime schedules and the employees were obligated to work such
schedules unless they had a substantial and justifiable reason for not doing
so.”31 This eventually led to several mandatory shifts on Sunday, Dewey’s
Sabbath.32 Dewey was ultimately fired after refusing to work on Sunday
or seek a replacement, both of which he believed would have violated his
faith.33
Despite both the 1966 and 1967 Guidelines,34 the Sixth Circuit
ultimately held that a “failure to accommodate an employee’s religious
observance should not be equated with religious discrimination.”35 It also
held that the company could not have discriminated against Dewey’s faith
because the policy “was equal in its application to all employees and was
uniformly applied.”36 The court went even further by reasoning that once
applicants or employees knew company policies did not suit their religion,
27. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 582.
28. See infra Section I(C).
29. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) aff’d mem., by an equally
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam) (Justice Harlan did not participate in the case).
30. Id. at 329.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 329.
33. Id. at 328.
34. The 1966 Guidelines were in effect before the litigation began, while the 1967 Guidelines
were issued during the early stages of the litigation. See Dewey, 429 F.2d at 329–30.
35. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 582 (Kaminer is one of the most cited academics opposed to
Hardison).
36. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 336.
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they were “not entitled to demand any alterations … to accommodate
[their] religious needs.”37
In another denied accommodation case, Charles Riley, a Seventh-day
Adventist, requested that he not be assigned to work from sundown on
Friday to sundown on Saturday so he could observe his Sabbath.38 His
request was denied, and he was ultimately fired for not yielding his
religious convictions.39 Channeling Dewey, the district court focused on
neutrality and shifted the burden onto employees by holding that a failure
to provide a religious accommodation was not tantamount to
discrimination.40
The district court in Riley reasoned that an employer have “a right to
make rules and working conditions to be imposed upon its employees for
the conduct of its business, if such rules are not in conflict with the law,
and any one accepting employment is bound to accept such rules and
working conditions.”41 The court went even further by broadly stating that
surely the great and diversified types of American business cannot be
expected to accede to the wishes of every doctrine or religious belief. If
one accepts a position knowing that it may in some way impinge upon
his religious beliefs, he [or she] must conform to the working conditions
of his employer or seek other employment.42

This district court also expressed doubt that the EEOC even had the
authority to place the burden on the defendant to prove an undue hardship:
“we feel it would be unreasonable . . . to require the complex American
business structure to prove why it cannot gear itself to the ‘varied religious
practices of the American people.’”43 It also held that the 1967 Guidelines
did not repeal the 1966 Guidelines, so, in its view, employers were still
free to establish a normal working week without accommodating
employees.44 The court’s sentiments flew in the face of the 1964 version
of Title VII45 and 1966 and 1967 Guidelines,46 which, when coupled,

37. Id.
38. Riley v. Bendix, 330 F. Supp. 583, 584 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
39. Id. at 585–86.
40. Id. at 591.
41. Id. at 589.
42. Id. at 590.
43. Id. at 588–89 (internal citations omitted).
44. Id. at 589.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (clearly prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
religion).
46. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967) (codifying the 1966 Guidelines) (duty to not discriminate
includes accommodation); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968) (codifying the 1967 Guidelines)
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established that failing to provide an accommodation resulted in
discrimination.47 The district court’s sweeping statements also effectively
signified that unless an employee espouses secularity or mainstream
Christianity, then to fully participate in the workforce, they must leave
their religion at home.
Running throughout these two typical pre-1972 decisions were the
common threads of secularism, neutrality, and fairness. But these threads
were woven through an inaccurate tapestry.48 Fortunately for Riley, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court.49 It held that the “Act proscribe[d]
not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation.”50 It also determined that the EEOC clearly
and authoritatively established a duty to provide religious
accommodations.51 Even though Riley ultimately prevailed, the Sixth
Circuit’s Dewey decision and the district court’s Riley decision, and many
others like them, finally led to Congress amending Title VII to address
many courts’ non-recognition or narrow treatment of religious
accommodation.
C. Congress Enacts the 1972 Amendment
In a direct repudiation of the Dewey court and others that did not
recognize or significantly narrowed the religious accommodation
requirement, Congress overwhelmingly amended Title VII, virtually
incorporating the 1967 Guidelines.52 Section 701(j) of the amendment
imposed an affirmative duty on employers to reasonably accommodate
their employees’ religious beliefs unless it would impose an undue

(compliance with Title VII requires accommodation unless employer can prove an undue hardship
would arise).
47. Historically courts treated denied accommodation claims as a separate cause of action.
However, the Supreme Court has since clarified that there are only two causes of action under Title
VII: disparate treatment or impact. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 18, at 12-I (citing EEOC
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015) (treating a claim based on a failure to
accommodate as a form of disparate treatment)).
48. “Neutrality is a theory about freedom of religion in a world that does not and cannot
actually exist.” STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN 159 (2000); see also infra Part III.
49. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
50. Id. at 1115–16 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
51. Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 (stating that “enforcing agency is entitled to great
deference” and treating “guidelines as expressing the will of Congress”)).
52. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000)).

269

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 36

hardship.53 In its entirety, it reads: “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”54
Although relatively brief and open-ended, the language unambiguously
requires accommodation, and employers are exempt if and only when
facing undue hardship. And together with Section 701(j)’s purpose and
corresponding legislative history, it is obvious that Congress envisioned
undue hardship to require something much greater than a de minimis
cost.55
Senator Randolph, the amendment’s sponsor, “was alarmed at the
inconsistent Title VII decisions with respect to religious discrimination.”56
And as a Seventh Day Baptist, he was particularly worried about cases
involving Sabbath observance.57 Against this backdrop, he introduced the
amendment “with the express purpose of protecting Sabbatarians.”58
While introducing the amendment, he directly expressed how Dewey and
other decisions, unfortunately, failed to realize Title VII’s scope.59 He also
signified that various decisions had “clouded the matter with some
uncertainty.”60 These cases were decided at the expense of workers who
had been marginalized because their “religious practices rigidly require
them to abstain from work . . . on particular days.”61 He believed the
amendment would “assure that freedom from religious discrimination in

53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The accommodation requirement and undue hardship standard
appear in Title VII’s definitions section.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 10, at 585 (most likely requiring significant or meaningful
expense).
56. Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to Provide
Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 523
(2010) (internal citation omitted).
57. Id.
58. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 584.
59. Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 705, 705–06 (1972) (“This amendment is intended, in good
purpose, to resolve by legislation—and in a way I think was originally intended by the Civil Rights
Act—that which the courts apparently have not resolved.”)).
60. Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 706).
61. 118 CONG. REC. at 705 (specifically mentioning the 750,000 Orthodox Jews and 425,000
Seventh-day Adventists who experienced a “partial refusal at times on the part of employers to hire or
to continue in employment” those employees.).
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the employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by law.”62
Ultimately, the amendment was unanimously passed by the Senate.63
During the floor debate, Randolph was asked questions about work
schedules and undue hardship. Regarding uniform work schedules,
Senator Dominick asked, “[a] young man . . . works 15 days on and then
is off 15 days. Would the amendment require an employer to change that
kind of employment ratio around, so that he would have to work a
customary 5- or 6- day week?”64 Randolph responded that this type of
rescheduling “would not constitute ‘undue hardship.’”65 Expressing
approval of the amendment’s scope, Dominick stated that the amendment
would help handle “various situations [that] keep arising because of our
pluralistic method of conducting our business in this country.”66 But when
Senator Williams posed the following scenario about a weekend-only
work schedule, Randolph responded that it would constitute an undue
hardship:
There are jobs that are Saturday and Sunday jobs, and that is all, serving
resorts and other areas. Certainly the amendment would permit the
employer not to hire a person who could not work on one of the two days
of the employment; this would be an undue hardship, and the employer’s
situation is protected under the amendment.67

These two answers present some boundaries of when an undue
hardship arises. Randolph stated, “701(j) would mandate accommodation
in most cases and that only ‘in perhaps a very, very small percentage of
cases’ would accommodation not be possible.”68 Likewise, Randolph
explained that the flexibility and gray areas were features rather than
bugs.69 He and other senators were fully confident that the purpose of the
amendment would be achieved.70 “Randolph believed this discretionary
approach would work because ‘the employer and employee, are of an
understanding frame of mind and heart.’”71 But he had too optimistic of
62. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation
Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 370 (1997).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 371 n.225 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 706).
65. Id.
66. 118 CONG. REC. at 715.
67. Id.
68. Kaminer, supra note 10, at 585 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 706).
69. Id. (internal citation omitted).
70. 118 CONG. REC. at 714.
71. Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the Different
Applications of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745,
751 (1998) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. at 706).
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an outlook on the relationship between employers and employees and the
types of cases that would reach the courts.72 As a result, the intended
broadness of the language became the impetus of the Hardison Court’s
“weakening of the amendment’s accommodation obligation.”73

II. H ARDISON ’ S A NOMALOUS DE M INIMIS S TANDARD
The 1972 amendment was destined to be the lodestar in all future
religious accommodation disputes involving undue hardship. Instead, the
Hardison Court’s unnatural de minimis standard “dramatically revised—
really, undid—Title VII’s undue hardship test.”74 In his dissent, Justice
Marshall condemned the Hardison Court’s stark departure from the
statute, in part, because of its overemphasis on neutrality and reverse
discrimination, which mirrored Dewey’s congressionally rejected
reasoning.75
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Like Dewey and a slew of other accommodation cases, Hardison
involved a religious minority’s Sabbath observance being at odds with a
company’s collectively bargained seniority system.76 In 1967, Larry
Hardison became a clerk at Trans World Airlines (TWA).77 Hardison was
a member of a department that operated 24-hours a day, 365-days a year,
and, like all employees, he was subject to a seniority system as part of a
collective-bargaining agreement.78 Under the agreement, shift
assignments were by seniority.79 The friction between Hardison’s
requested accommodation and the rigid seniority system was the focal
point of the parties’ dispute.80
After about a year on the job, Hardison joined the Worldwide Church
of God.81 A central tenant of his new faith involved observing the Sabbath

72. Id. at 752.
73. Id.
74. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227, 1228 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari).
75. Compare TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), with Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
76. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63.
77. Id. at 66.
78. Id. at 66–67.
79. Id. at 67.
80. See id. at 66–71.
81. Id. at 67.
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“by refraining from performing any work from sunset on Friday until
sunset on Saturday.”82 It also obligated him to observe specific religious
holidays.83 When he first informed his supervisor of his religious beliefs,
the supervisor worked with Hardison and the union foreman to reach an
amicable agreement.84 At first, Hardison’s supervisor suggested that the
union should seek a job swap or change his days off.85 Hardison also
agreed to a framework that would allow him to observe his religious
holidays in exchange for him working more traditional holidays when
asked.86 Fortunately, the problem temporarily went away when he
transferred to a new shift that allowed him to work at times conducive to
his Sabbath.87
The situation unraveled when Hardison switched buildings to work a
day shift.88 Although he merely moved from one building to the next, “the
two buildings had entirely separate seniority lists.”89 In his original
building, Hardison’s seniority allowed him to work at times in harmony
with his Sabbath.90 But in the new building, he was the second lowest
employee in seniority, which precluded him from bidding to have Saturday
off.91 Because of his low seniority, he was asked to work on Saturday to
cover a coworker, and, although “TWA agreed to permit the union to seek
a change of work assignments for Hardison,” the union was unwilling to
play ball.92 A four-day work week proposal was also rejected, and a change
to the twilight shift would have still caused him to work on Friday after
sundown.93 After he could not obtain an accommodation, Hardison was
fired for insubordination because he did not report to work on Saturday.94
Because the dispute arose before 1972, relying on the pre-amendment
version of Title VII and the 1967 Guidelines, Hardison sued for religious
discrimination.95 While the district court held that it would have been an

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. (the referenced shift was 11:00 PM to 7:00 AM).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id.
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undue hardship for TWA to accommodate Hardison,96 the Eighth Circuit
reversed after outlining several accommodations TWA could have granted
that would not have resulted in an undue hardship.97 Contrasting TWA’s
lack of effort to grant an accommodation, the Eighth Circuit noted that
Hardison repeatedly went out of his way to minimize the impact his
religious needs might have had on the company.98 Despite the circuit
court’s thoughtful analysis that was fully in line with EEOC guidance, the
Supreme Court went back to its old ways—relying on neutrality and
fairness, which Congress outright rejected in the 1972 amendment.
B. Dubious Legal Analysis, Faulty Legal Conclusion
The Hardison Court’s decision was built on legal reasoning that
flouted the relevant statutory and regulatory texts, the purpose of Title VII,
and relevant legislative intent. Channeling the Dewey court’s reasoning,
the Hardison Court relied on neutrality and fairness arguments that failed
to view the uneven playing field religious minorities face in a workplace
catered to secularity and mainstream Christianity.99 Ultimately, the
Court’s holding prevented the 1972 amendment from ever attaining its full
fruition, which has left countless religious employees to bear high
economic, social, and moral costs.
At the outset, the Hardison Court quickly dispatched the Eighth
Circuit’s thoughtful holding, along with the several suggested
accommodations TWA could have granted.100 After haranguing Congress
and the EEOC for providing what it considered “no guidance for
determining the degree of accommodation that is required,” the Court
concocted its own formulation for determining undue hardship.101
Although it would have cost TWA a meager $150 to accommodate
Hardison for three months,102 the Court ultimately concluded that “[t]o
require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison
Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”103 This “single sentence with little
96. Id. at 70.
97. See Hardison v. TWA, 527 F.2d 33, 39–42 (8th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (“The
company may not accept the role of a Pontius Pilate. An effort to accommodate … must be made.”).
98. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 70.
99. See Alexis, supra note 6, at 23–24.
100. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 77 (“We disagree with the Court of Appeals in all relevant
respects.”).
101. Id. at 73.
102. After three months, Hardison could have transferred back to his previous assignment,
which would have solved the problem. Id. at 84.
103. Id.
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explanation or supporting analysis” announced the Court’s newly minted
de minimis standard.104 Although the sentence is facially unremarkable, it
has had a long-lasting, detrimental effect on religious accommodation
claims.
The de minimis standard is now the marching order for the entire
federal judiciary. If accommodation costs merely a penny more than the
de minimis, all courts must hold that the employer is absolved of its
affirmative duty to accommodate an employee. By making the threshold
to prove undue hardship so low, the Court essentially gave employers carte
blanche to preclude certain religious persons from obtaining or
maintaining meaningful employment—the very thing Title VII was
enacted to prevent.105 Though the Hardison Court’s interpretation of
undue hardship is unfortunate, it is not a surprise after examining where it
spent most of its focus.
Interestingly, the Court’s primary focus was not determining the
extent of the religious discrimination Hardison experienced. Instead, most
of the Court’s attention was directed to the value and importance of
collectively bargained seniority systems and the neutrality such systems
bring.106 Just like the Dewey court and others that incorrectly focused on
neutrality and fairness for all employees, the Supreme Court treated
Hardison’s faith with a measure of incredulity and as a substantial threat
to unionized labor.107 After referencing the seniority system throughout
several pages, the Court wrote the following strong words:
[I]t appears to us that the system itself represented a significant
accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular, of all of TWA’s
employees. As will become apparent, the seniority system represents a
neutral way of minimizing the number of occasions when an employee
must work on a day that he would prefer to have off. Additionally,
recognizing that weekend work schedules are the least popular, the
company made further accommodation by reducing its work force to a
bare minimum on those days. . . .
....
. . . We agree that neither a collective-bargaining contract nor a
seniority system may be employed to violate the statute, but we do not

104. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227, 1228 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari).
105. See id. (“With Hardison, uneven results like these have become increasingly
commonplace.”).
106. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79–83.
107. See id.
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believe that the duty to accommodate requires TWA to take steps
inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement. Collective bargaining,
aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between
management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy, and
seniority provisions are universally included in these contracts.108

In this lies how the Court completely sidelined Title VII and the 1967
Guidelines to promote its endorsement of collective bargaining in national
labor policymaking—all at the expense of religious minorities.109 Here the
Court treats Title VII’s congressionally mandated religious
accommodation as inconsequential when compared to companies
providing other, neutral accommodations to all employees through a
collective bargain.
But this is the same type of reasoning Congress rejected when it
enacted the 1972 amendment.110 And even though Title VII gives some
deference to a seniority merit system, the statute requires the employer to
accommodate regardless of whatever system is in place, leaving an undue
hardship as the only congressionally mandated exception.111 So, under
Title VII, preserving neutrality is not a justifiable excuse to keep
employers from providing reasonable accommodations. Because of the
Court’s overemphasis on collective-bargaining seniority systems, it is easy
to understand why it so easily agreed with the district court that “TWA
had done all that could reasonably be expected within the bounds of the
seniority system.”112 It is similarly apparent why the Court dubiously
interpreted undue hardship to favor seniority systems.
C. Where Purpose, Text, and Intent Meet: Justice Marshall’s Scathing
Dissent
Responding to the Court’s questionable interpretation of undue
hardship, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, issued a scathing
dissent.113 It utilized the purpose, text, and intent of Title VII and the
108. Id. at 78–79 (emphasis added).
109. Although collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) should be afforded some deference,
under the statutory scheme (without Hardison’s low de minimis standard), rigid enforcement of CBAs
would preclude most religious minorities from accommodations in many key parts of the workforce,
therefore, nullifying Title VII’s purpose.
110. See Kaminer, supra note 10, at 583 (responding “to the refusal of the courts to follow the
1967 EEOC Guidelines, Congress enacted § 701(j), which tracks the language of the 1967
Guidelines.”).
111. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 77 (majority opinion).
113. See id. at 85–97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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EEOC guidelines to their fullest extent. And because the Court concocted
such a convoluted definition of undue hardship, Justice Marshall had no
shortage of statutory interpretation ammunition to use against the
Majority.
As to Title VII’s purpose, Justice Marshall began by acknowledging
the “[p]articularly troublesome … plight of adherents to minority faiths
who do not observe the holy days on which most businesses are
closed―Sundays, Christmas, and Easter—but who need time off for their
own days of religious observance.”114 Then, after recounting the great
lengths Congress and the EEOC went to issue the religious
accommodation requirement, he explained that the Court’s decision dealt
a “fatal blow to all [of] those efforts.”115 As one who was himself no
stranger to discrimination and marginalization, Justice Marshall knew the
heavy burden the Court placed on the backs of religious minorities. To
him, such a result was “deeply troubling.”116 By reducing the threshold
required to prove an undue hardship to a negligible level, the Court was in
effect subjecting “adherents of minority religions to make the cruel choice
of surrendering their religion or their job.”117 But this is a choice that
should be completely foreign “for a society that truly values religious
pluralism.”118
Justice Marshall also took to task the Court for its inordinate focus on
neutrality and fairness, which ran directly counter to the religious
accommodation requirement:
With respect to each of the proposed accommodations . . . that the
Court discusses, it ultimately notes that the accommodation would have
required “unequal treatment” in favor of the religious observer. That is
quite true. But if an accommodation can be rejected simply because it
involves preferential treatment, then the regulation and the statute, while
brimming with “sound and fury,” ultimately “signif[y] nothing.”
The accommodation issue by definition arises only when a neutral
rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious practices of a
particular employee. . . . What all [accommodation] cases have in
common is an employee who could comply with the rule only by
violating what the employee views as a religious commandment. In each
114. Id. at 85.
115. Id. at 86.
116. Id. at 87.
117. Id.; see also Robert J. Friedman, Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: The Persistent
Polarized Struggle, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 143, 160 (2010) (“A virtually negligible
financial loss is not a hardship at all.”).
118. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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instance, the question is whether the employee is to be exempt from the
rule’s demands. To do so will always result in a privilege being
“allocated according to religious beliefs,” unless the employer
gratuitously decides to repeal the rule in toto.119

Although Justice Marshall did not draw a line of where an accommodation
becomes an undue hardship, his reasoning about neutrality squared with
the purpose of Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement, and it
handily dispatched the banality of the Majority’s misplaced focus on
neutrality and fairness.120 His reasoning also tracked the statute’s text.
Hearkening to the text, Justice Marshall concluded that “[w]hat the
statute says, in plain words, is that such allocations are required unless
‘undue hardship’ would result.”121 And about the Court-created de minimis
definition, he wrote that “[a]s a matter of law, I seriously question whether
simple English usage permits ‘undue hardship’ to be interpreted to mean
‘more than de minimis cost.’”122
Justice Marshall also reprimanded the Court for stating that the “brief
legislative history of [Section] 701(j) is . . . of little assistance” in
interpreting undue hardship.123 He found that the legislative “history [was]
far more instructive than the Court allow[ed].”124 Because of the Court’s
“oblivious[ness] of the legislative history” of the 1972 amendment, it
“reject[s] any accommodation that involves preferential treatment [and]
follows the Dewey decision in direct contravention of congressional
intent.”125
Justice Marshall’s dissent brought together the purpose, text, and
legislative intent of Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement in a
way that repudiates the Majority’s reasoning. His reliance on the text,
above all else, along with the purpose and statutory history, also serves as
a model the current Court should emulate in religious accommodation
cases. But Justice Marshall’s greatest contribution to future
accommodation cases was not his keen inter-theory statutory
interpretation. He concluded his dissent with a profound statement on
Hardison’s real cost—a cost that is still being paid:

119. Id. at 87–88 (internal citations omitted).
120. To follow the Court’s arguments regarding “unequal treatment” to their natural conclusions
would make what Justice Marshall called “a mockery of the statute.” See id. at 88.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 93 n.6.
123. Id. at 74 (majority opinion).
124. Id. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 88–89.
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What makes today’s decision most tragic, however, is not that
respondent Hardison has been needlessly deprived of his livelihood
simply because he chose to follow the dictates of his conscience. Nor is
the tragedy exhausted by the impact it will have on thousands of
Americans like Hardison who could be forced to live on welfare as the
price they must pay for worshiping their God. The ultimate tragedy is
that despite Congress’ best efforts, one of this Nation’s pillars of
strength―our hospitality to religious diversity―has been seriously
eroded. All Americans will be a little poorer until today’s decision is
erased.126

Justice Marshall understood the immeasurable value of human dignity.
Unfortunately, the Majority made it easier for employers to protect their
pocketbooks rather than provide religious accommodations, and Justice
Marshall’s statement has proven prophetic as for the countless Americans
who have received Hardison’s same fate.

III. H ARDISON ’ S H OBBLING E FFECTS AND H IGH C OSTS
Larry Hardison is not the only person forced to pay a high cost
imposed on him by the Hardison Court. Shortly after Hardison was
decided, the EEOC reported that many employers believed that Hardison
relieved them of any obligation to provide religious accommodations.127
The EEOC also said that Hardison led to “widespread confusion
concerning the extent of accommodation,” and some groups of individuals
were not accommodated,128 “especially those with non-traditional
religious needs.”129 These trends have persisted in the ensuing decades.
In 2016, the Department of Justice reported that many employers are
still not aware of their obligation to provide accommodations and that
there is a concern that religion-based employment discrimination is
underreported.130 Even though there is an underreporting concern,
religious accommodation cases have ballooned during the past two

126. Id. at 96–97 (footnote omitted).
127. See Federal Legislation Clinic, Title VII and Flexible Work Arrangements to Accommodate
Religious Practice & Belief, GEO. UNIV. L. CTR. (2005).
128. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 Appendix A (including Sabbath and religious holiday observance, prayer
breaks during a shift, dietary restrictions, prohibition against membership in labor and other
organizations, and exemptions from dress and grooming standards).
129. Engle, supra note 62, at 381 (internal citation omitted) (quoting EEOC Commissioner
Eleanor Holmes Norton).
130. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., COMBATING RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION TODAY: FINAL REPORT
17–18 (2016).
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decades as the United States has become more diverse.131 This is especially
true for Muslims or other religious groups perceived to be Muslim.132 A
recent amicus brief before the Court shared the startline statistic that
although “Muslim Americans comprise 1.1% of the national population,
25% of religious accommodation cases involve Muslim employees.”133
And much of the time, accommodation claimants belong to other protected
classes, creating strong intersectional undercurrents.134
Moreover, although Hardison and a significant number of
accommodation cases have involved Sabbath-day or religious holiday
observance,135 employees whose faiths require strict dress and grooming
have also not fared well.136 This is true of cases involving religious
expression or practice in the workplace as well, such as a Muslim requiring
an accommodation to pray five times a day.137 Looking at Hardison’s de
minimis standard, lower courts traditionally consider negligible economic
impact and lost efficiency.138 But Hardison’s de minimis standard allows
employees to establish undue hardships far too easily even when money
or efficiency are not involved. By looking at a few model cases, it becomes
apparent how easy it is for an employer to buck an accommodation just by
amorphously alleging an undue hardship under the de minimis standard.
They also illustrate the typical toll religious minorities pay in trying to
enter the secularized and mainstream-Christianized American
workplace.139

131. See
Religion-Based
Charges
FY
1997
–
FY
2020,
EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/religion-based-charges-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-1997-fy-2020
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2022); see also Alexis, supra note 6, at 2; Dallan F. Flake, Restoring Reasonableness
to Workplace Religious Accommodations, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1673 (2020).
132. See Alexis, supra note 6, at 2 (Much of the discrimination arose in the wake of 9/11.).
133. Brief for Amici Curiae Muslim Advocates and the Sikh Coalition in Support of Petitioner
at 10, Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021), cert. denied.
134. See, e.g., EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 18, at 12-V(A) (“Where a given
religion is strongly associated—or perceived to be associated—with a certain national origin, the same
facts may state a claim of both religious and national origin discrimination. All four bases might be
implicated where, for example, coworkers target a dark-skinned Muslim employee from Saudi Arabia
for harassment because of his color, religion, national origin, and/or race.”).
135. See Blair, supra note 56, at 517.
136. Kiran Preet Dhillon, Covering Turbans and Beards: Title VII’s Role in Legitimizing
Religious Discrimination against Sikhs, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 215, 216 n.6 (2011) (some faiths
require, for example, “that Sikh men wear a turban and not shave their beards; that Muslim women
wear a hijab; that Orthodox Jewish men wear a yarmulke; and that Pentecostal women wear skirts,
rather than pants.”).
137. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 18, at 12-IV(C).
138. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 10, at 614.
139. See Alexis, supra note 6, at 24 (“[A]ll non-Christian employees face an uphill battle under
the current ‘undue hardship’ standard . . . .”).
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Alima Delores Reardon was a schoolteacher and devout Muslim.140
According to her faith, she wore a headscarf whenever she was in public,
including in her classroom.141 She did so for two years without incident.142
But in 1984, she was told three times to go home and change out of her
headscarf and long flowing dress that covered everything but her hands.143
If she refused, she could not teach because of an archaic law forbidding
religious garb in the classroom.144 True to her religious convictions, she
refused and was excluded from teaching.145 When the United States sued
on her behalf against the Board and the Commonwealth, the district court
ruled in Reardon’s favor.146 The court denied the defense’s arguments that
they would have suffered an undue hardship by not enforcing the religious
garb law and that the Board’s interest to not endorse religion in public
schools made such an accommodation an undue hardship.147 In its
analysis, the district court relied on the fact that the Commonwealth had
never enforced the religious garb law, nor had it “ever taken any
responsive action against violators of the statute” as dispositive.148
Furthermore, “the Board itself ha[d] permitted teachers in . . . public
schools to wear religious garb or symbols in the past without adverse legal
consequences.”149
Relying on the reasoning from a nearly indistinguishable Oregon
Supreme Court case involving a Sikh teacher, the Third Circuit vigorously
reversed the district court.150 With little analysis, the court quickly held
that accommodating Reardon “would have been an undue hardship.”151
Relying on neutrality, the court concluded that Pennsylvania “regards the
wearing of religious attire by teachers while teaching as a significant threat
to the maintenance of religious neutrality in the public school system, and
accordingly conclude that it would impose an undue hardship to require
the Commonwealth to accommodate Ms. Reardon and others similarly
140. United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 884–85.
145. Id. at 885.
146. United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV. A. 87-2842, 1989 WL
52506, at *14 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1989), rev’d, 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (also mentioning that Title
VII superseded the state’s law).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 888.
151. Id. at 891 (finding that sanctions attached to the unenforced law were the undue hardship).
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situated.”152 By reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit effectively held
that Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, and other individuals that require overt
religious garments need not bother becoming teachers in Pennsylvania
unless they willingly discard that integral part of their faith.
In another accommodation case, twenty-eight current and former
employees of JBS USA, the world’s largest producer of meat, sued the
company for denying them an accommodation to shift meal breaks during
Ramadan.153 All the plaintiffs were black Muslims from Somalia, and all
believed, to one extent or another, that missing prayers was a sin against
God and that prayers needed to be offered within an appointed window.154
The JBS plant had a CBA that entitled employees to two breaks during
each shift, but the CBA had a rigid timetable for when the breaks could be
taken.155 There was also an unofficial policy allowing employees to ask
supervisors for unscheduled breaks, which were then given at a
supervisor’s discretion.156 The facts are somewhat messy because of the
number of plaintiffs and the number of years involved. But for present
purposes, it is sufficient to say that the court ultimately found “that the
possible effect on employee morale” by moving the meal break “was more
than a de minimis cost.”157 Again, by considering how non-praying
coworkers might feel about some employees taking a modified break to
pray, the court focused on neutrality in a way that precludes minority
religious adherants from being able to participate in a “neutral” and secular
workforce entrenched in mainstream Christianity.
The Fifth Circuit also decided a case based on coworker morale.158
Marvin Brener, an Orthodox Jew, was employed as a pharmacist at a
hospital pharmacy, which operated seven days per week.159 After
informing his employer of his faith, his supervisor ordered another
pharmacist to switch shifts with Brener on a few instances, after which
Brener arranged additional shift swaps with his coworkers.160 When
Brener informed his supervisor that Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur fell

152. Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
153. EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1149, 1152 (D. Colo. 2018).
154. Id. at 1154 (showing a prime example of intersectional plaintiffs).
155. Id. at 1155–56.
156. Id. at 1156–57.
157. Brief for Amici Curiae Muslim Advocates and the Sikh Coalition in Support of Petitioner
at 12, Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021) (citing JBS USA, 339 F. Supp.
3d at 1182, 1195), cert. denied.
158. Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).
159. Id. at 143.
160. Id.
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on days when he was scheduled, the supervisor directed other pharmacists
to trade Christmas holidays with Brener so he could observe Jewish
holidays.161 Around this time, the supervisor began to receive complaints
from employees about what they perceived as Brener’s “special
treatment.”162 Then, when Brener asked for an accommodation to observe
another Jewish holiday, the supervisor said that he could not direct a shift
swap because of morale but that he would approve voluntary swaps.163
After failing to find another pharmacist to swap with him, Brener did not
show up to work, and, after disciplinary meetings with his supervisor and
hospital administrators, Brener ultimately had to offer his resignation.164
Relying on Hardison’s neutrality rationale, the Fifth Circuit held that
accommodating Brener not only affected morale, but it also discriminated
against his coworkers because they were not Jewish like Brener.165 The
court, therefore, found that any accommodation would have resulted in an
undue hardship.166
Each of these cases shows how easy it is for an employer to establish
undue hardship and how courts still rely on specious secularity and uneven
neutrality rationales to show that undue hardships are present. Although
Hardison has not ever received a robust defense for its statutory
interpretation, some Hardison proponents think its result was necessary,
despite dubious statutory interpretation. The strongest proponents couch
their support of the de minimis standard as “an attractive and workable
standard for limiting harms to third parties.”167 And to them, avoiding
harm to others is a “bedrock tenet of the law”168 because “it is ‘disturbing’
to ‘forc[e] third parties to pay for the exercise of . . . [religious] rights’ of
other parties.”169
There are two primary problems with these arguments. First, the de
minimis standard flouts the language, purpose, and legislative intent of the
statute, and so it is built on a shaky foundation.170 Second, and even more
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 143–44.
165. See id. at 147.
166. Id.
167. Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215, 217
(Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017).
168. Id. at 229.
169. Stephanie H. Barclay, First Amendment “Harms”, 95 IND. L.J. 331, 334 (2020) (quoting
Tebbe et al., supra note 167).
170. See supra Section I(C)–Part II.
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deleterious, focusing mainly on third party harm assumes that all parties
are on an equal playing field. Religious minorities are not on an equal
playing field but “face a stacked deck in a society” built upon secularity
and mainstream Christianity.171 Somebody has to pay the high cost for
these Americans to fully participate in the workforce. Congress primarily
placed the bill on employers—the party more fit to pay the price.172 But by
reducing undue hardship to no more than the de minimis, the Hardison
Court took the bill from the employers and passed it to employees. So, as
Stephen L. Carter aptly put it, “[W]hat we are bold to call neutrality means
in practice that big religions win and small religions lose.”173 Fortunately,
Hardison’s hold is waning.

IV. T HE I DEAL W AY TO G IVE H ARDISON THE H OOK
The past forty-five years are laden with literature on Hardison and
possible solutions. Although nearly all of the solutions are thoughtful and
would help mitigate Hardison’s heavy hold,174 only two solutions have
enough gumption to give Hardison the hook: legislation or Supreme Court
action. Ultimately, the Supreme Court is the surest avenue to restore Title
VII’s undue burden standard. The challenge is finding the right vehicle.
A. Legislation
Legislation might be the most potent solution, but it is not the ideal
solution. Legislation in this context would be superfluous. Congress
already addressed the matter in 1972. But then the “Court dramatically
revised—really, undid—Title VII’s undue hardship test.”175 The error is
the Court’s alone, not Congress’s.176 Besides maybe the Hardison Court,
no serious person would ever equate de minimis with undue hardship.
171. See Alexis, supra note 6, at 24.
172. Even though the de minimis standard really doesn’t comport with the statute, getting rid of
it wouldn’t mean that just any accommodation would be allowed. An undue hardship would still be
the cap. See infra Part IV.
173. CARTER, supra note 48, at 160.
174. See, e.g., Matthew P. Mooney, Between a Stone and a Hard Place: How the Hajj Can
Restore the Reasonable Accommodation to Title VII, 62 DUKE L.J. 1029 (2013) (calling for more
aggressive enforcement by the DOJ and EEOC); Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A
Hobson’s Choice Model for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467 (2006) (arguing that
employees should only receive accommodations when employees face a true Hobson’s choice).
175. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227, 1228 (2021), cert. denied
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 1229 (“There is no barrier to our review and no one else to blame. The only
mistake here is of the Court’s own making—and it is past time for the Court to correct it.”).
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Their respective definitions are simply incompatible. “The de minimis cost
test cannot be reconciled with the ‘plain words’ of Title VII, defies ‘simple
English usage,’ and effectively nullif[ies]’ the statute’s promise.”177
Not only would further legislation be redundant, the current political
landscape makes a legislative solution unlikely.178 It is also “costly to draft
and pass legislation overriding an undesirable judicial interpretation.”179
Congress has tried to repudiate Hardison several times, including months
after Hardison was decided,180 but no attempt has ever been successful,
despite widespread support.181 Even so, Congress has in a way already
responded to Hardison by how it devised other statutes involving undue
hardships.
In his recent dissent in the denial of certiorari, Justice Gorsuch
explained that since Hardison, Congress has included undue hardship
standards in other civil rights laws.182 Challenging Hardison’s de minimis
standard, he explained how these statutes require employers to furnish
accommodations unless it would impose “‘significant difficulty or
expense’ in light of the employer’s financial resources, the number of
individuals it employs, and the nature of its operations and facilities.”183
Congress went out of its way to ensure that these laws would not receive
the Hardison treatment.184 The careful congressional calculation in
subsequent legislation evinces that Congress intended Title VII’s undue
hardship standard to be akin to substantial difficulty or expense rather than
Hardison’s peculiar de minimis threshold.185

177. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 88, 89, 92 n.6, 93 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
178. See generally Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
179. Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM. &
MARY L.
REV. 1251, 1258 (2013).
180. See Robert A. Caplen, Note, A Struggle of Biblical Proportions: The Campaign to Enact
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, 16 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 592–93, 600
(2005).
181. See Flake, supra note 131, at 1683.
182. Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1228 (referencing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), and the Affordable Care
Act (ACA)).
183. Id. (“With these developments, Title VII’s right to religious exercise has become the odd
man out.”).
184. See Stephen B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s
Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV.
390, 425 (1995).
185. Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1228–29.
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Although Congress hasn’t given Hardison the hook, it doesn’t need
to. Congress provided enough for the Court to undo what it did in
Hardison, which at the very least means abrogating the de minimis
standard, and at the very most, comporting Title VII to a significant
difficulty or cost threshold. And such an outcome seems much more likely
in the current Court.
B. Supreme Court Action
The landscape has fundamentally changed since Hardison. The
Roberts Court is much more favorable to cases involving religion than the
Burger Court was when deciding Hardison.186 On top of being far more
favorable to cases involving religion, there have been major developments
that show why it is inevitable that the Court will at some point give
Hardison the hook.
First, in a disparate-treatment case involving a young Muslim
woman’s headscarf, the Court made it easier for claimants to establish
Title VII religious discrimination claims.187 Although Abercrombie did
not involve accommodation or undue hardship, the Court neutralized
Hardison’s flawed neutrality rationale. The Court held that “Title VII
requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an
accommodation.”188 The Court reached this conclusion “because Title VII
does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious practices … it
gives them favored treatment.”189 Justice Thomas also pointed out that
Hardison didn’t really interpret the current form of Title VII but only the
1967 EEOC guidelines.190 Though insightful, lower courts still regard their
hands as tied by Hardison.191 For this reason, the most recent
developments are paramount.
In the past three years, three Justices have signaled that hope is on the
horizon.192 The hope comes from three denied petitions asking the Court

186. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Roberts Court and the Transformation of Constitutional
Protections for Religion: A Statistical Portrait, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
187. See generally EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015) (failing to
hire her because of her religion violated Title VII’s nondiscrimination provision).
188. Id. at 775.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 785–86 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. See Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227, 1228 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari).
192. It only takes four justices to grant petitions for certiorari. Stewart A. Baker, A Practical
Guide to Certiorari, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 611, 612 (1984).
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to reconsider Hardison’s de minimis standard.193 Each petition involved a
member of a minority religion requesting a schedule accommodation to
observe their respective Sabbath, just like in Hardison.194 And each gives
a glimpse of what is, and more on point, what is not, the right vehicle for
the Court to reconsider Hardison.
In Patterson v. Walgreen Co., Justice Alito, with Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch joining, opined that although the specific petition wasn’t the right
vehicle, the Court should reconsider Hardison given its dubious de
minimis standard.195 Within the year, two more similar petitions were sent
to the Court.196 Justice Gorsuch, along with Justice Alito, dissented this
time. Instead of merely stating that the Court should reconsider Hardison,
Justice Gorsuch threw down his gauntlet against Hardison’s de minimis
standard.197 The main inference to draw from Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is
his direct challenge to his colleagues, which suggests that the Court
seriously considered granting the petitions.198 He stated, “I cannot see what
more we could reasonably require,” implying that, at least, he and Justice
Alito found Small’s petition a worthy vehicle.199 But an even greater
takeaway from this dissent is Justice Thomas’s absence. Given that Justice
Thomas joined the other two in Patterson, he most likely did not find
Small a suitable vehicle. Herein lies the difficulty getting the Court to give
Hardison the hook: finding the right vehicle.
C. Finding the Right Vehicle
Although three Justices have openly expressed their desire to revisit
Hardison, the right vehicle first needs to make its way to the Court. Once
there, because of the defects of the de minimis standard, it is all but
inevitable that the Court will abrogate Hardison.200 Although Sabbathobservance accommodation claims have played the primary role in

193. Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 140 S. Ct. 685 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari); Small, 141 S. Ct. at 227–29; Dalberiste v. GLE Assocs., Inc., 814 F. App’x 495 (11th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, No. 19-1461, 2021 WL 1240921 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2021).
194. Except the petitions did not involve CBAs.
195. Patterson, 140 S. Ct. 685, 685–86 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
196. Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1227; Dalberiste, 814 F. App’x at 495.
197. See Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1228–29.
198. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/small-v-memphis-light-gas-water/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2022) (the case was distributed and
relisted for conference over the course of several months).
199. See Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1229 (reasoning that, but for Hardison, the lower courts would
have ruled in Small’s favor).
200. See supra Section I(C)–Part II.

287

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 36

developing the case law, they are typically more complex and more often
involve monetary expenses than other accommodation claims.201 Sabbath
observance cases are, therefore, not the ideal vehicle for giving Hardison
the hook, as shown in Patterson, Small, and Dalberiste’s failures to garner
four votes for cert.
Instead, petitions involving intangible costs, coworker complaints,
and intersectionality are more likely to be granted, especially ones about
dress and grooming.202 This is because they don’t typically involve
tangible monetary costs,203 they often involve intersectionality,204 and they
almost always require employees to choose between their job or
religion.205 Additionally, as Part III demonstrated, these types of cases are
usually built upon sweeping yet sparse judicial reasoning and neutrality’s
shaky foundation—both foundations that would not withstand the Court’s
review.206 But even if a vehicle arrives with perfect factual features, as two
respected Sixth Circuit judges noted in Small, “litigants should consider”
directly challenging the de minimis standard “going forward.”207 In other
words, the right vehicle needs to challenge Hardison head on.
Once an ideal vehicle finally reaches the Court, it is almost inevitable
that the Court will give Hardison the hook. Based on the statute’s text,
purpose, and accompanying legislative intent, there is no way that the
current Court will preserve Hardison’s unnatural de minimis standard.
And relying on the same, in lieu of the de minimis standard, the Court
should follow the reasoning of Justice Gorsuch,208 other judges,209 and the
majority of Title VII scholars210 by interpreting Title VII’s undue hardship
201. See Kaminer, supra note 10, at 614–15.
202. For example, a case involving similar facts to Abercrombie would be great, but
Abercrombie unfortunately didn’t turn on Hardison.
203. See, e.g., Rachel M. Birnbach, Love Thy Neighbor: Should Religious Accommodations
That Negatively Affect Coworkers’ Shift Preferences Constitute an Undue Hardship on the Employer
under Title VII?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1331, 1370 (2009) (quoting Ninth Circuit: “If relief under Title
VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees, who have not suffered
discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting the wrongs to which
the Act is directed.”) (internal citation omitted).
204. See supra Part III.
205. See supra Part II.C. (Justice Marshall’s dissent).
206. “Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an
accommodation.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 775 (2015).
207. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J.,
concurring) (joined by Judge Kethledge) (reasoning that Small didn’t really contest employer’s undue
hardship defense), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (2021).
208. See Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S. Ct. 1227, 1227–29 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari).
209. See, e.g., Small, 952 F.3d at 826–29 (Thapar, J., concurring).
210. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 56; Caplen, supra note 180; Kaminer, supra note 10.
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standard to mean significant difficulty or expense. But even if the Court
takes a gentler approach, “it is past time for the Court to correct it.”211
Hardison is an affront to the civil rights crusade and anathema to
pluralism, and, as Justice Marshall said in the beginning, “All Americans
will be a little poorer until [Hardison] is erased.”212 Giving Hardison the
hook will restore the undue hardship standard and inevitably promote
religious pluralism and protect employees’ dignity, especially religious
minorities who have long borne Hardison’s high costs.
Kade Allred*

211. Small, 141 S. Ct. at 1229.
212. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
* I’m incredibly grateful to Associate Dean Michalyn Steele for supervising this endeavor,
Professor Stephanie H. Barclay for strategizing with me on the topic, and Professor Gene C. Schaerr,
who, along with Joshua J. Prince, provided me with hands-on experience advocating for Hardison’s
abrogation before the Supreme Court. It is dedicated to my wife, ShaeLynn, my son, Clark, and my
parents, Michael and Kathy.
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